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This paper considers a model of defensive medicine where doctors
are imperfect agents of insured patients. A national insurer subsidises
both curative and preventive medical care consumed by risk averse
patients. We show that in such an environment, the optimal liability
regime is similar to the no-fault systems of Sweden and New Zealand
where the doctor faces zero liability. The reason is that the subsidy on
preventive medicine is a better instrument to induce the optimal level
of care than the malpractice regime.
JEL Classi￿cation: I11, I18, D60.
Keywords: no-fault liability systems; malpractice liability; defensive
medicine, copayment ratio.
1 Introduction
Medical Malpractice regimes di⁄er widely across countries. At one extreme,
New Zealand and Sweden have a comprehensive no-fault regime. Under
such no-fault systems, victims of accidents resulting from medical care are
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1compensated by taxpayer-funded public insurance schemes. Crucially, these
systems serve as the links between compensation for the patient and pun-
ishment of the doctor (Welier, 1993; Towse and Danzon, 1999; Danzon,
2000). Doctors face no ￿nancial consequences from treatment induced er-
rors (although there are professional disciplinary bodies which punish gross
negligence).
At the other extreme are ￿third-party liability￿systems where doctors
are held liable for treatment related injuries. The standard economic ef-
￿ciency argument for third-party liability is that by requiring the injurer
to compensate the victim, the accident risk is internalised and the e¢ cient
level of preventive care is provided (Shavell, 2006). In a standard model of
accident liability therefore, a no-fault system would induce too little care by
injurers 1.
However, this standard logic cannot be directly applied to treatment re-
lated injuries. In particular, the types of preventive actions that doctors
undertake in response to liability risk (e.g. requesting diagnostic tests) are
often paid for by health insurers (Kessler, Summerton and Graham 2006;
Danzon, 1985). If patients (or their insurers) are unable to judge the ap-
propriate level of care, then this subsidy coupled with malpractice pressure
might provide incentives to choose too high a level of preventive care.
There is now a body of empirical evidence which shows that there is
indeed too much preventive care in health (referred to as defensive medi-
cine) (Kessler and McLellan, 1996, 2002; Dubay et al., 1999). These papers
exploit the e⁄ect of changes in rules of malpractice liability to assess the
extent to which health care is driven by malpractice pressure. Kessler and
McClellan (1996) ￿nd that reforms which decreased malpractice risk had
little e⁄ect on the health outcomes of Medicare patients but signi￿cantly
reduce medical costs. They conclude that this is evidence of the existence
of ￿defensive medicine￿- that is care beyond the point at which there is any
real health bene￿ts to the patient. Kessler and McLellan (2002) ￿nd that the
actual e⁄ect of such reforms depends on the degree of medicare penetration,
1For example, increased fatal road accidents were observed following the adoption of
no-fault liability in automobile accident (Cummins, Phillips and Weiss (2001); Landes
(1982) .
2suggesting that supply-side cost sharing and tort reforms are substitutes.
Fenn et al (2004) provide UK based evidence of the existence of defensive
medicine. They document an increase in the utilisation of costly diagnostic
imaging in response to increased malpractice liability at the hospital level.
Currie and Macleod (2008) study the impact of changes to speci￿c mal-
practice rules on birth related complications. They ￿nd that the e⁄ect of
tort-reform to be more nuanced than suggested by previous studies ￿￿nding
that decreased malpractice risk had harmful e⁄ects on patients. They con-
clude that ￿incentives created by the tort system are complex and interact
in important ways with other incentives facing physicians. Without know-
ing more about the speci￿c incentives faced by physicians, it is hazardous to
predict that a speci￿c tort reform will either reduce unnecessary procedure
use or have bene￿cial impacts on health.￿
These studies suggest that the e⁄ect of malpractice pressure has to be
analysed in the context of the other incentives in the system. The objective
of this paper is to analyse the interaction between health insurance and
the liability regime. We argue that in the presence of risk-averse patients
who purchase insurance against health shocks, the optimal liability regime
is lower than in the absence of health insurance ￿so much so that a no-fault
liability might be optimal.
To our knowledge, theoretical models which consider the implications
of health insurance for the optimal liability regime have not been analysed
in the literature. Danzon (1985) considers how the structure of health in-
surance might distort doctor￿ s choice of prevention as well as malpractice
insurance. She points out that since tests are subsidised by insurers whereas
doctor￿ s time is not, this distortion in the relative price of preventive inputs
causes a over-use of tests and under-utilisation of time in preventing acci-
dents. However, her paper does not explicitly consider the health insurance
and accident liability systems as a joint problem in optimal health system de-
sign. Currie and MacLeod (2008) have a theoretical section in their empirical
model where procedure choice interacts with the nature of the third-party
liability. They show that taking this ￿extensive margin￿into account can
have important implications for the predicted e⁄ect of malpractice reform.
In this paper we construct a theoretical model that explicitly takes into
3account the interaction between the health insurance contract and the lia-
bility regime. We show that in an environment where patient-copayments
apply to preventive care, a no-fault liability regime is optimal. We also con-
sider an environment where there is supply -side cost sharing. We show that
our theoretical model matches Kessler and McLellan￿ s (2002) ￿nding that
supply side pressure and malpractice pressure are substitutes.
2 Demand-side cost sharing
There are three types of agents in this model: the consumer, the doctor and
the National Health Insurers (NHI). While we assume that health care is
funded through taxes our model is equally applicable to a perfectly compet-
itive private health insurance market where the consumer pays a fair-priced
premium.
The patient￿ s expected utility when sick is
Up = V [W ￿ H + h ￿ ￿(h + d) ￿ R] ￿ p[d](L + z);
where V [:] is the individual￿ s utility function with V 0 > 0 and V 00 < 0, W￿H
is the income after the health loss, h is the 1 unit of curative care that he
needs, ￿ is the copayment ratio re￿ ecting the degree of health insurance
provided by the NHI, and R is the tax rate imposed by the NHI to fund
health insurance. The probability of medical error, p, is a function of the





= p, and p(0) = p: The price of d is 1; so d is also the expenditure
on preventive care. Injury entails a loss (L + z) where L is insurable and
z is an additional loss which is uninsurable (e.g. the psychological trauma
su⁄ered by a treatment related injury).
We consider d which is designed to lower the risk of treatment related
injury as "preventive medicine￿ . An example of such expenditure would
be the use of diagnostic tests.2 The term d can also be interpreted as
re￿ ecting additional expenditure involved in choosing lower risk procedures.
2Kessler and McClellan (2002) analyse the e⁄ect of malpractice reform on the utilisation
of diagnostic vs. therapeutic interventions on Medicare patients following a heart attack.
They ￿nd that malpractice pressure had greater e⁄ect on diagnostic expenditure.
4For example, doctors might choose to deliver a baby by Cesarean section
in ￿marginal￿pregnancies simply to lower the probability of birth related
malpractice suites (Dubay, Kaestnerb and Waidmann, 1999). In this case,
d is the extra costs incurred in a Cesarean section as opposed to a natural
delivery for achieving the same delivery outcomes (h). The doctor chooses
d and patients accept the doctor￿ s choice.
The doctor￿ s utility is
Ud = Y ￿ E ￿ p[d]L + ￿e Up;
where E is a ￿xed e⁄ort cost of providing 1 unit of h and, assuming that
the patient is fully insured against L,
e Up = V [W ￿ H + h ￿ ￿(h + d)] ￿ p[d]z:
We assume that 0 < ￿ < 1 . The term ￿ in the doctor￿ s utility function
re￿ ects the degree of agency. The assumption that ￿ > 0 is designed to
capture the fact that doctors are not purely motivated by pro￿ts but are
￿imperfect agents￿who will expand e⁄ort to bene￿t their patient (McGuire,
2000).3 It also implies that the doctor is sensitive to the patient￿ s out-of-
pocket payment for d but not to R the tax rate paid.4 The doctor￿ s wage Y
is paid by the NHI for treating the patient. We assume that the doctor has
to be provided a reservation utility U
d for his service.
The NHI￿ s preferences are the patient￿ s ex ante utility given by
￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)V [W ￿ R] + ￿Up;
where ￿ is the probability that the consumer falls ill.
3See for example Ellis and McGuire (1986, 1990); Vaithianathan (2003); Dranove and
Spier (2003) for similar models of doctor-patient agency.
4There is evidence that doctors respond to patient￿ s out-of-pocket costs. Rossiter
and Wilensky,(1984) found that physician-initiated visits were responsive to the degree of
cost-sharing and insurance status of the patient. Pham et al (2007) report that 78% of
physicians they survey report routinely considering out-of-pocket payments when selecting
diagnostic tests.
53 Third-party vs. No-Fault System
In this sub-section, as a benchmark, we consider two extremes of the liability
regimes: the no-fault regime (;) similar to New Zealand and the third-party
liability regime (III) (we will turn to a continuum of regimes in the next
section). Under a no-fault insurance system, the consumer is paid L by the
NHI if there is a medical error. Under a third-party liability regime he is
paid L by the doctor.
The timing of the game is identical under each liability regime and is as
follows:
1. NHI chooses copayment ￿ to maximise consumer￿ s ex ante utility.
The tax rate, R, is set to satisfy the NHI budget constraint, and the
wage rate for the doctor Y is contracted to give him his reservation
utility U
d.
2. Nature moves and patient falls ill with probability ￿:
3. The doctor delivers 1 unit of h with e⁄ort E and chooses d.
4. An accident occurs with probability p[d] and the NHI (doctor) pays
the patient L in the ; (III ) regime.
5. The doctor receives his wage for treating the patient.
We look for subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and solve this game using
backward induction. The doctor￿ s utility under the two regimes are
Ud
III = Y ￿ E ￿ p[d]L + ￿e Up
Ud
; = Y ￿ E + ￿e Up;
where the sub-scripts denote the regime. The choice of d by the doctor
depends on ￿ and the liability regime and is denoted by dIII [￿] and d; [￿] :
dIII [￿] = argmax
d
￿p[d]L + ￿e Up; (1)
and
d; [￿] = argmax
d
￿e Up (2)
6Lemma 1 (i) d0
fIII;;g < 0; (ii) dfIII;;g [0] = d (iii) for a given ￿ 2 (0;1],
d; [￿] < dIII [￿]
Proof. For regime III, the optimal d satis￿es the following condition:
￿(1 + ￿)p0 [d]z = ￿V 0 [W ￿ H + (1 ￿ ￿)h ￿ ￿d]￿; (3)
with the marginal bene￿t on the LHS and marginal cost on the RHS. Simi-
larly, for regime ;, the optimal d satis￿ed the following condition:
￿￿p0 [d]z = ￿V 0 [W ￿ H + (1 ￿ ￿)h ￿ ￿d]￿: (4)
As ￿ increases, for both regimes, the marginal bene￿t on the LHS remains
the same while the marginal cost on the right hand side increases. Thus
d0
fIII;;g < 0. When ￿ = 0, the marginal cost on the LHS is zero. With
p0 (d) < 0 and the marginal bene￿t always positive, the optimal d is the
maximum possible, d. Since MBIII > MB; and MCIII = MC;, we have
d; (￿) < dIII (￿). A corollary of this is that for any given d￿, the copayment
ratio ￿ required to induce such d￿ is lower in regime ;. For any given d￿,
as the MB is higher for regime III, we need a higher ￿ to satisfy the ￿rst
order condition.
Lemma 1 means that the d[￿] functions look like what is shown in Figure
1. For any given ￿, the doctor always prescribe more defensive medicine
under regime III than under regime ;. The corollary of this is that to
induce any given level d, the ￿ required under regime ; is lower than under
regime III. Note that the only reason d < d under either regimes is due to
the fact that the patient has to pay for ￿ proportion of the costs of preventive
care and the doctor cares about the patient￿ s copayment. Therefore, as ￿
falls, the doctor will continue to prescribe more preventive care until the risk
of an accident risk is minimised. When copayment is zero, then under both
regimes, doctors will prescribe the maximum level of preventive medicine
and the probability of iatrogenic e⁄ects will be p.
Since the doctor is paid a compensating wage di⁄erential and has con-
stant utility of U













Figure 1: Best Response d(￿)
di⁄erent. In particular, in regime III, the doctor has to be compensated
for facing a higher liability risk.
YIII = U




d + E + ￿e U
p
;:
The NHI has a zero-budget constraint and funds its costs from a lump-
sum tax R. The tax R depends on the liability regime:
RIII = ￿ ((1 ￿ ￿)(h + dIII [￿]) + YIII);
and
R; = ￿ ((1 ￿ ￿)(h + d) + p[d; (￿)]L + Y;):
The NHI￿ s utility under each regime is















; = V [W ￿ H + (1 ￿ ￿)h ￿ ￿d ￿ R;]
￿p[d; (￿)]z:
Since the doctor￿ s utility is ￿xed at U
d and the NHI has zero pro￿t,
maximising ￿ is equivalent to maximising social welfare in our model.
Theorem 1 Social welfare is higher under regime ; than regime III .
Proof. First of all note that Lemma 1 implies that if e d is the best response
of the doctor to a copay e ￿III under III , then there exists some e ￿; < e ￿III,
such that e d is the best response under regime ;. Let e ￿III be the optimal
copay under regime III. Let Yi be the wage of the doctor under regime i
and copay e ￿i.
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:
Therefore, the income of the doctor under regime III has to more than com-
pensate him for the increased liability he faces since he now treats patients
who face higher copays and are therefore worse o⁄:





The tax rate under regime III and copay e ￿III is
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where W￿ = W ￿ H + h ￿e ￿;
￿
h + e d
￿
￿ e RIII.
Therefore, their ex-ante utility can be written as
e ￿; = (1 ￿ ￿)V
h
W ￿ e R￿
i
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10and ex-ante utility is
e ￿III = (1 ￿ ￿)V
h
W ￿ e RIII
i





Then from the fact that consumers are risk averse, and the principle that
they will purchase fair priced insurance for the loss Z with probability ￿,
and that W￿ < W ￿ RIII we have that
(1 ￿ ￿)V (W ￿ RIII ￿ ￿Z) + ￿V (W￿ ￿ ￿Z)
> (1 ￿ ￿)V (W ￿ RIII) + ￿V (W￿ ￿ Z);
and since V [￿] is increasing we have
(1 ￿ ￿)V (W ￿ ￿Z + ￿") + ￿V (W￿ ￿ ￿Z + ￿")
> (1 ￿ ￿)V (W ￿ RIII ￿ ￿Z) + ￿V (W￿ ￿ ￿Z)
This implies that e ￿; > e ￿III. Moreover, given that e ￿III was optimal for
regime III, this completes the proof.














III]) be the subgame perfect equi-
librium for regimes ; and III respectively. Suppose that ￿￿
; ￿ ￿￿
III. From








III]. From Theorem 1, ￿￿
; > ￿￿
III.
Given that ￿ only a⁄ects ￿ indirectly through the doctor￿ s choice of d,








III] such that ￿III
￿









This violates the condition that (￿￿
III;d￿
III [￿￿
III]) is a subgame perfect equi-
librium. Thus, in equilibrium, we must have ￿￿
; < ￿￿
III.
The above theorem is quite intuitive. Given that regime III always
gives the doctor more incentive to prescribe defensive medicine than regime
;, if the preference is such that it is optimal to set ￿III in regime III,
any b ￿ greater than ￿III would not be optimal in regime ;. First, if it is
optimal to raise ￿ to reduce the consumption of defensive medicine in region
;, ￿III would never be optimal in regime III since doctor has even stronger
incentive to increase d in regime III. On top of that, raising ￿ in regime
; gives the patient less insurance and would decrease welfare. This would
violate our result ￿￿
; > ￿￿
III.
114 First-best preventive medicine
To see how the health insurance contract and the liability regime interact,
we compare the doctor￿ s choice of d under four extreme scenarios according
to liability regime and health insurance contract.
Let us de￿ne the ￿rst-best level of d as the ex post e¢ cient level, i.e.,
the level that would be chosen by a fully informed and uninsured consumer
who faces the full risk of the loss. Therefore, d1 (the ￿rst best level) is where
the marginal bene￿t from d is equal to the marginal cost:
￿p0 [d](L + z) = V 0 [W ￿ H ￿ d]:
We now compare the d chosen by the doctor under four scenarios with d1.
The doctor chooses d to maximise Ud
i , i = f;;IIIg.
1. Patient Uninsured, Doctor Fully Liable: ￿ = 1; and ￿ = 1. In
this case the doctor￿ s choice of d satis￿es
￿p0 [d](L + ￿z) = ￿V 0 [W ￿ H ￿ d]
For ￿ = 1, d = d1. For ￿ < 1, the choice of d
￿p0 [d](L + ￿z)
￿
= V 0 [W ￿ H ￿ d]
and since
￿p0 [d](L + z) >
￿p0 [d](L + ￿z)
￿
d > d1.
There is too much preventive medicine, since the doctor over-weights
his own liability compared to the cost faced by the patient.
2. Patient Uninsured, No-Fault Liability: ￿ = 1 and ￿ = 0. In this
case, the doctor￿ s choice of d satis￿es
￿p0 [d](￿z) = ￿V 0 [W ￿ H ￿ d];
and we have d < d1.
There is too little preventive medicine, since the doctor ignores the
accident loss L.
12￿ = 0 ￿ = 1
￿ = 0 d = d > d1 d = d > d1
￿ = 1 d < d1 d > d1
Table 1: Summary of optimal d versus the doctor￿ s choice.
3. Patient Fully Insured, Doctor Fully Liable: ￿ = 0 and ￿ = 1.
In this case the doctor￿ s choice of d satis￿es
￿p0 (d)(L + ￿z) = 0:
As analysed also in Lemma 1, for ￿ = 0, we have d = ￿ d > d1.
There is too much preventive medicine, since the doctor over-weights
his own liability and patients face no costs.
4. Patient Fully Insured , No-Fault Liability: ￿ = 0 and ￿ = 0. In
this case the doctor￿ s choice of d satis￿es
￿p0 [d](￿z) = 0:
We again have d = ￿ d > d1.
There is too much preventive medicine, since the patients face no costs.
The results are summarised in Table 1.
Consistent with the standard economic theory of tort law, the theory
we outline here predicts that with less liability, physicians will exert less
care (see Landes and Posner [1987]; Shavell [1987]; and Danzon [2000] for
exhaustive reviews). However, this exercise has con￿rmed that if we consid-
ered the optimal liability regime for an uninsured patient (￿ = 1), we might
conclude that ￿ = 0 is not optimal. In the case of uninsured patients, our
model shows that ￿ = 0 provides too little incentive for preventive medicine
while ￿ = 1 provides too much. However, once we take the ￿ = 0 case, we
see that whatever the liability regime, there will be too much d.
135 Partial Liability
In the previous sub-section we presented a stark contrast between a com-
plete third-party insurance where doctors were fully exposed to the risk of
liability and a completely no-fault system. We now consider a system where
the liability can be shared between the doctor and the NHI and ask whether
regime ￿ is still optimal. Under partial liability, the NHI imposes a pro-
portionate third-party liability, where the doctor is liable for ￿L if there is
some medical error. The rest of the loss (1 ￿ ￿)L is paid for by the NHI.
The timing of the game is identical to that above, but this time at stage
1, the NHI chooses ￿ and ￿ . Under this scenario, ￿ = 0 corresponds to the
no-fault regime while ￿ = 1 corresponds to the third party regime. For the
doctor￿ s optimisation problem, d￿ is determined by
￿V 0 [W ￿ H + (1 ￿ ￿)h ￿ ￿d]￿ = ￿p0 [d](￿L + ￿z):
As ￿ increases, the marginal bene￿t increases and the optimal d increases.
As ￿ increases, the marginal cost increases and the optimal d decreases.
Theorem 3 No-fault system (￿ = 0) is optimal when there is demand side-
cost sharing and inelastic h .
Since the Proof of Theorem 3 follows along very similar lines to the proof
of Theorem 1, we provide the proof in the Appendix.
6 Elasticity in Demand for h
So far we have assumed that demand for h was inelastic to highlight the
interaction between ￿, ￿, and d. In this section, we analyse what happens if
h is elastic with respect to ￿. With a variable h chosen by the doctor, there
is now an additional source of over-consumption, and a lower ￿ encourages
the over-consumption of h as well as d. Thus we have the traditional moral
hazard problem (Pauly, 1968) .
The timing and pay-o⁄s are the same as the previous section, except
that H = H [h] with H0 < 0, H00 < 0, and H (h) = 0 for h ￿ h. Let h[￿]
be the doctor￿ s demand for h. Then
14h[￿] = max
h
Y ￿ E ￿ p[d]￿L + ￿e Up:
Therefore,
h[￿] = ￿H0￿1 [￿]:
Given H0 < 0, H00 < 0, the demand for h is downward sloping, h0 [￿] < 0.
With elastic demand for h, the optimality of ￿ = 0 is no longer so
straightforward. An exception is if the insurer can set di⁄erential co-payment
rates for h (we label as ￿h) and d (we label as ￿d) . In this case, it is easy
to see that the results from Theorem 3 continues to apply. The NHI sets
the rates f￿d;￿hg which maximises its social welfare function. Consider the
optimal (￿￿
d;￿￿
h) when ￿ > 0. Let h￿ = h[￿￿]. Then to see that Theorem1
directly applies, we need only replace h with h￿ in that proof and everything
goes through as before.
We now turn to the more di¢ cult issue of a single ￿ with an elastic
demand for h. The next Theorem shows that in this case, as long as the
elasticity of demand for h is not too high, a no-fault system continues to be
optimal.
Theorem 4 No-fault system (￿ = 0) is optimal in the presence of demand
side-cost sharing , elastic h, and a common copayment (￿) as long as h[￿] is
not too elastic.
Proof. The proof follows similar lines to Theorem 1. In particular, consider
the optimal copayment ￿￿ under a regime where ￿ > 0 (refer to this as regime
III) which implements d￿ and h￿. Now, consider no-fault regime ; (￿ = 0)
. There exists a copayment b ￿ < ￿￿ such that d￿ continues to be consumed.
At this lower copayment, the h implemented, b h will be higher than h￿. Let
￿ = b h ￿ h￿. We have
￿[￿ > 0] = (1 ￿ ￿)V
h




W ￿ H [h￿] ￿e ￿
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(h￿ + d￿) + p[d￿](1 ￿ ￿)L + e Y
￿
and




(h￿ + ￿ + d￿) + p[d￿]L + b Y
￿
:
The compensation wage required for the doctors are
e Y = U + E + p[d￿](￿L + ￿z) ￿ ￿V [W ￿ H + h￿ ￿ ￿￿ (h￿ + d￿)]
and
b Y = U + E + p[d￿]￿z ￿ ￿V
h
W ￿ H + h￿ + ￿ ￿b ￿(h￿ + ￿ + d￿)
i
:
Since both H [:] and V [:] are continuous in ￿, ￿[￿ = 0] is continuous
in ￿. On the other hand, ￿[￿ > 0] is independent of ￿. Theorem 1 shows
that for ￿ = 0, ￿ = 0 is strictly preferred. Therefore, there exists some ￿
small enough, that Theorem 1 continues to hold.
7 Supply side cost sharing
So far we have only considered the interaction between the liability regime
and demand side-cost sharing. We now turn to the optimal liability when
there is zero patients coinsurance, but the doctor pays some c for each test
or x-ray that he orders. We use inelastic h to illustrate the results. The
patient￿ s utility when sick is therefore
Up = V [W ￿ H + h ￿ R] ￿ p[d]z:
The doctor￿ s utility is
Ud = Y ￿ E ￿ p[d]￿L ￿ cd + ￿e Up;
where
e Up = V [W ￿ H + h] ￿ p[d]z:
Therefore, doctor prescribes d to equalise the marginal bene￿t with the
16supply-side cost c







Equation 5 illustrates the point that supply side cost sharing and the liability
regime are substitutes since it is the ratio of c to (￿L + ￿z) that matters.
This result echoes the ￿ndings of Kessler and McLellan (2002) which showed
that areas with higher penetration of managed care (i.e. areas with higher
c) were less responsive to tort reform (i.e. a lowering of ￿).
We assume that when imposing supply-side cost sharing, the doctor￿ s
income Y will have to rise to compensate him for the payment of c therefore
Y = U + E + p(￿L + ￿z) ￿ ￿V [W ￿ H + h] + cd: (7)
The contribution paid by the doctor is collected by the NHI and therefore
lowers the tax rate:
R = ￿ (h + d) + p(1 ￿ ￿)L + Y ￿ cd: (8)
We now turn to the optimal c. In the case of demand side cost sharing,
we showed that there was a welfare gain in having ￿ = 0 since it allowed a
lower copayment - which was bene￿cial to the consumer who is risk averse.
However, in our model the doctor is risk-neutral. Therefore, we would expect
there to be no added advantage from allowing ￿ = 0. The following result
shows this to be the case.
Theorem 5 The liability regime (￿) and the supply-side cost (c) are perfect
substitutes.
Proof. Consider implementing a particular d￿ through some ￿ 2 [0;1] and
a c where c = d￿ (￿￿L + ￿z). Welfare is
￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)V [W ￿ R￿] + ￿V [W ￿ R￿] ￿ ￿p￿z
















which only depends on d￿ and not on ￿ or c. The NHI therefore chooses
d to maximise 9 and any (￿;c) that implements d yields identical levels of





￿; and (￿;c) where c = d￿ (￿L + ￿z):
8 Concluding Comments
The purpose of this paper is to point out that a no-fault regime might
be optimal in systems where the NHI has additional demand or supply side
mechanisms to a⁄ect preventive care. In the case where the NHI relies purely
on a demand-side mechanism, no-fault systems o⁄er better insurance to
consumers and are therefore welfare improving. On the other hand, systems
with third party liability are forced to impose higher coinsurance rates in
order to prevent excessive prescribing of preventive medicine by doctors who
face liability.
Our model abstracts from the fact that doctors￿choice to treat is also
e⁄ected by the tort environment (Currie and MacLeod 2008). That is, while
no-fault liability might discourage the use of preventive care, it might en-
courage doctors to preform more dangerous procedures such a as C-sections
which in a more liable environment they might have eschewed. The e⁄ect of
no-fault liability on procedure choice is an interesting area of future research.
The main practical objection to more countries adopting no-fault systems
is that they would be expected to bring forth an increase in compensation
costs (Kessler, Summerton and Graham, 2006). This concern might be to
do with the additional dead-weight costs involved in collecting taxes to pay
for the compensation, and issue which we ignore in this paper.
189 Appendix
Proof of Theorem. 3. Under the partial liability system, the patient is
still fully insured against the L:
Up = V [W ￿ H + (1 ￿ ￿)h ￿ ￿d ￿ R] ￿ p[d]z;
and
e Up = V [W ￿ H + (1 ￿ ￿)h ￿ ￿d] ￿ p[d]z
The doctor￿ s utility is
Ud = Y ￿ E ￿ p(d)￿L + ￿e Up:
For the doctor￿ s optimisation problem, d￿ is determined by
￿V 0 [W ￿ H + (1 ￿ ￿)h ￿ ￿d]￿ = ￿p0 [d](￿L + ￿z):
As ￿ increases, the marginal bene￿t increases and the optimal d increases.
As ￿ increases, the marginal cost increases and the optimal d decreases.
For any
￿
e ￿ > 0;e ￿
￿
such that the doctor￿ s best response is e d, let b ￿ be
the ￿ which induces e d as the doctor￿ s best response when ￿ = 0. From the
above inspection of the marginal cost and bene￿t, we have b ￿ < e ￿. The ex
ante consumer welfare is therefore
￿
h
e ￿;e ￿; e d
i
= (1 ￿ ￿)V [W ￿ R]+￿V
h
W ￿ H + h ￿e ￿
￿












0;b ￿; e d
i
= (1 ￿ ￿)V [W ￿ R]+￿V
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For the doctor￿ s compensation wage,
Y
h
e ￿;e ￿; e d
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0. For e ￿ > 0, the doctor needs to be compensated more than the additional
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where Z =
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. Let e ￿ be the optimal ￿￿ given e ￿ and the doctor￿ s best response.
This completes the proof.
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